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First Paper.
The Negotiable Instruments Law has now been adopted
by twenty states' as well as for the District of Columbia,
and there is little doubt that in a very few years, at the
longest, it will be the law throughout this country.
Aside from the importance of the subject with which it
deals, the act claims a peculiar interest as being the first
important step taken in this country towards codifying any
branch of the law. In 1878, Judge Chalmers published
his digest of the law relating to bills of exchange, in the
preparation of which he read through all the English cases
(some twenty-five hundred in number) beginning with the
first reported case in 1603. Where there was a dearth of
English authority, he states that he had recourse to the
American decisions and to the usages among bankers and
'Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
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merchants. Two years after the publication of the digest,
the institute of Bankers and the Associated Chambers of
Commerce instructed him to prepare a bill on the subject.
This he did, his aim being, to use his own words, "to reproduce, as exactly as possible, the existing law, whether it
seemed good, bad or indifferent in its effects." The bill
was introduced into Parliament in i88i, and after a few
amendments had been made by the Select Committee of
merchants, bankers, and lawyers, to which it was referred by
the House of Commons, and by the Select Committee
headed by Lord Bramwell, to .which it was referred by the
House of Lords, it passed both houses without opposition.
It is worth noticing that amendments were inserted only
when the Committee was unanimous in their favor, no
amendments being pressed on which there was a difference
of opinion. Practically, the English bill was an enactment
into law of Judge Chalmer's digest. For the most part the
propositions of the act were taken word for word from the
propositions of the digest, and excepting a few amendments
which were inserted to choose between conflicting decisions,
or to correct some admittedly serious errors in the law, the
whole purpose-of the English Bills of Exchange Act was to
reproduce, as exactly as possible, the existing law. This
act has now been in force in Great Britain for twenty years,
and has been adopted by all of her self-governing colonies.
English merchants, bankers and lawyers appear to unite in
the opinion that it has been successful even beyond expectation.
At the Annual Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, held in Detroit in 1895, a resolution was
passed requesting the Committee on Commercial Law to
procure, as soon as practicable, a draft of a bill relating to
commercial paper based upon the English Bills of Exchange
Act and on such sources of information as the Committee
might deem proper to consult. The matter was referred
to a sub-committee consisting. of Judge Lyman D. Brewster,
of Connecticut; Henry C. Willcox, of New York,. and
Frank Bergen, of New Jersey, who secured Mr. John. J.
Crawfovd, of the New York bar, a well-known expert on
the law of bills and notes, to draft the proposed bill.
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The English act had'followed the continental codes as to
form, i. e. it dealt primarily with bills of exchange, and then
applied those provisions, so far as they were applicable, to
promissory notes, adding provisions which were peculiar to
the latter class of instruments. Deeming this form to be
unsuited to American conditions-the use of bills of
exchange being proportionately less extensive here than in
Europe-Mr. Crawford adopted a form of his own, which
grouped together the provisions applicable to all kinds of
negotiable instruments, and then collected, under separate
articles, the 'provisions specially affecting the different
classes.
Mr. Crawford's draft was laid before the sub-committee,
each section being annotated with reference to the decisions
of the Courts, the comments of text-book writers, and the
statute laws "of the several states. This draft (slightly
amended by the sub-committee) and the draftsman's notes
were printed along with the English bill for comparison, and
copies were sent to each member of the Conference, to many
prominent lawyers and law professors, and to several
English judges and lawyers, with an invitation for suggestions and criticisms. The draft was then submitted to the
Conference at Saratoga in 1896. The twenty-seven Commissioners who were in attendance-representing fourteen
different states-went over it section by section, and made
some amendments to it, "most of which," says Mr. Crawford, "were such changes in the existing law as I had not felt
at liberty to incorporate into the original draft."2 The draft
as thus amended, was adopted by the Conference, and in
such form has been submitted to the various state Legislatures.
The most important contribution that has been made to
the act is the Ames-Brewster controversy. In the Fourteenth HarvardLaw Review, Professor James Barr Ames,
Dean of the Harvard Law Faculty, for some years lecturer
on Bills and Notes in the Harvard Law School, and the
author of the leading case book on the subject, published an
article criticising some twenty-three sections of the new act,
'Crawford's An. N. I. L

Preface.
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and expressing the opinion that notwithstanding the act's
many. merits, "its adoption by fifteen states must be
regarded as a misfortune, and its enactment in additional
states, without considerable amendment, should be an impossibility." Professor Ames' criticisms were answered by
Judge Lyman D. Brewster, President of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, and a member of the subcommittee which drafted the act. The discussion consists
of two articles in the Harvard Law Review, by Professor
Ames, 3 and two articles by Judge Brewster, one published
in the Yale Law Journal aid one in the Harvard Law
Review. 4 In a pamphlet recently published by the Harvard
Law Review Publishing Association, containing the text of
the act, together with these articles, there are added a supplementary note by Professor Ames criticising two additional
sections of the act-a reply thereto by Judge Brewster, and
a letter containing comments on some points of the discussion by Mr. Arthur Cohen, Q.' C., a member of the cornmittee which framed the English act, who was recommended
by Judge Chalmers as one of the three best authorities in
England on the law of bills and notes.
As Judge Brewster remarks, "No keener weapon than
that wielded by the accomplished Dean of the Harvard Law
School could be turned against the Negotiable Instruments
Law." Professor Ames knows more about the law of bills
and notes from the student's standpoint than any one else
in this country. Whatever one's conclusions may be as to
the soundness of his criticisms, there is little doubt that few,
if any, of the vulnerable points in the act have escaped his.
notice, and that the sections he criticises are those most
likely to come up for construction. A familiarity with his
criticisms and with Judge Brewster's replies cannot but aid
both the bench and bar in giving some sections of the act
their proper meaning. This consideration, together with the
difficulty 9f understanding the discussion in its present form,
where the criticism of each kection, the answer, replication
and rejoinder are spread out through four separate articles,
has prompted me to write a review of the controversy.
* 14 HarvardLaw Review, 241; 14 Harvard Law Review, 442..
* io Yale Law Journal, 84; 15 Harvard Law Review, 26.
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Two general observations may be made, which should be
borne in mind throughout the entire discussion. In the
first place, no one can judge the new act fairly who does not
realize that the Commissioners were attempting to codify
the law.5 Their aim was not to reform the law of negotiable paper. It was to state accurately and concisely the
existing law. Of course, here and there it was necessary
to choose between two or more conflicting views. Very
frequently a section changes the law in a small minority
of, states which had departed from the almost uniform current, of authority. Occasionally, though very
rarely and only when there seemed to be no room for a difference of opinion, the law was deliberately changed. But
the main, and almost the sole purpose of the framers of the
Negotiable Instruments Law was to reproduce, as exactly
as possible, that which the great weight of authority had
declared to be the law.
Second, in interpreting some sections of the act, the language used must be given not a hyper-literal meaning, but
a reasonable legal meaning, derived, to some extent, from a
knowledge of the cases on which the sections are based. It
would be a great achievement for a code to state the law, in
every instance, in language capable of meaning only one
thing, even to a man entirely without legal training and
unacquainted with what the law was before the code. But
it will be a long time before such a code is framed. Of
course, in the great majority of instances the Negotiable
Instruments Law does this. But it is not a serious reflection on the act that in some instances a familiarity with the
cases on which the language of the act is based, is-if not
The discussion between Professor Ames and Judge Brewster makes
no attempt to take up the broad question as to the propriety and utility
of codification. For a most learned and able argument against codification, the reader may be referred to a book by R. F. Clarke, Esq.,
of the New York bar, entitled "The Science of Law, and Law Making." The arguments in favor of at least a partial codification of such
a branch of the law as that relating to commercial paper gre concisely
stated by judge Brewster in a paper read before the American Bar
Association in 1898 on "Uniform State Laws," which is reprinted
in the report of the Ninth Conference of the Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Legislation in the United States.
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necessary-at least very helpful in deciding what the language means. Indeed, Judge Brewster said to the American Bar Association, in discussing the new act in 1898,
"Care has been taken to preserve, as far as possible, the use
of words which have had repeated construction by the
courts, and have become recognized terms in the law merchant."
With these observations we may proceed to consider the
discussion of particular sections.
Section 3, par. 2:
"An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act though coupled
with a statement of the transaction which gives rise
to the instrument."
"What," asks Professor Ames, "do these words mean?
Do they cover the case of a note coupled with the words
'given as collateral sectirity for, A.'s debt to the payee?'
Such an interpretation, although a literal one, would be
deplorable and would nullify several decisions."3 It would,
indeed, be deplorable, for such notes are clearly conditional
and courts have uniformly refused to regard them as negotiable.
Judge Brewster's answer is that this clause does not apply
to the case put since "a note 'given as collateral security'
contains notice, upon its face, that the note is not an unconditional promise to pay, but conditional upon the nonpayment
of the principal debt." And he refers to Section I, par. 2,
which requires a negotiable instrument to contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum -certain in money."
There is no danger that any court will ever make the innovation that would result from the "deplorable interpretation," indicated by Professor Ames. Nor could such a con-clusion easily be reached from the language of the act.
Without turning back to the first section, the very clause
under discussion speaks only, of "an unqualified order or
promise." If "the statement of the transaction" contains
'Robbins v. May, iiA. & E. 213; Haskell v. Lambert, 16 Gray 592;
Costelo v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293; 134 Mass. 280, 285; American Bank
v. Sprague, 14 R. I. 410; Hall v. Merrick, 40 Up. Can. Q. B. 566.
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a qualification of the order or promise, if it shows that the
instrument is not payable at all events, but only on a contingency, the instrument can scarcely be said to contain "an
unqualified order or promise." A fair and reasonable reading of the section would scarcely require even the most literal
interpreter to hold that this clause covers a note given as collateral. To do so, he would have to construe it as meaning,
"a note is unconditional provided you start it with an
unqualified promise, no matter how many qualifications and
conditions are later embodied in the statement of the transaction which gave rise to the instrument." Such an interpretation would be far-fetched, not literal.
But Professor Ames makes another criticism of this
clause of Section 3, which is less easily disposed of. The
real purpose of this clause, as we learn from Mr. Crawford,'
who drafted the act, and from Judge Brewster, is to cover
the case of a note which contains a statement that it is given
for a chattel, which is to be the property of the owner of
the note until the note is paid. Such notes are usually
regarded as negotiable.8 Several states, however', have
taken the opposite view, holding that such notes are nonnegotiable, 9 and it was to bring the latter states into accord
with the more general view and unify the law on this point,
that this clause was inserted. But will itaccomplish this
object? That is Professor Ames' further criticism. The
only case touching the point is of little or no assistance, 10
'Crawford. An. N. I. L. 12.
' Chicago Co. v. Merch. Bank, 136 U. S. 268; Howard v. Simpkins, 69
Ga. 773; Choate v. Stevens, ii6 Mich. 28; Heard v. Dubuque Bank, 8
Neb. io; Mott v. Havana Bank, 22 Hun. 354; National ,Bank of Royersford v. Davis, 6 Montg. Co. (Pa.) 99; Kimball v. Mellon, 8o Wis.'133.
' Sloan v. iMfcCarthy, 134 Mass. 245; South Bend Co. v. Paddock, 37
Kan. 510; Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530; Deering v.
Thorn, 29 Minn. 120.
'0 Third Bank v. Spring, 28 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 9. White, J., held
that a note, containing a statement that it is given for a piano, the
title of which shall remain in the payee until the note is paid, is not a
negotiable instrument. After so holding, he simply remarks that Section 3, par. 2 of the Negotiable Instruments Law "has no application
here." This decision was reversed in 5o N. Y. App. Div., 66, the court
making no allusion to the statute, but merely holding with the current
of authority that such a note is negotiable. Judge Brewster points Qut
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but it may seriously be doubted whether this clause will
overrule the decisions at which it was aimed. It does not
cover a note "given as collateral security" because such a
note "contains notice, upon its face, that the note is not an
unconditional promise to pay." Suppose a judge decides
that a chattel note (one containing a statement that it is
given for a chattel which is to remain the property of the
payee until the note is paid) is not an unconditional promise
to pay. Would he feel that this clause covers such an
instrument? And at least some of the courts which hold
chattel notes non-negotiable do-so on precisely this ground.
-Sloan v. McCarthy.loa By the instrument sued upon in
that case, the defendant promised to pay Sloan, one month
from date, $85, for a roan horse known as A. M., "said
horse to be and remain the entire and absolute property
of the said Sloan until paid for in full by me." The
court said this note contained a conditional promise and
so was non-negotiable. "If the rhoney were not paid by the
.defendant at the time specified, the plaintiff could, if he
chose, rescind the conditional sale and the defendant would
then have no right to the horse, and would no longer be
liable to pay the note.

.

.

.

If the horse should die

within the month without fault on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff would be disabled from transferring the title
and could not maintain an action on the contract.""1 Now,
if Section 3, par. 2, does not cover a note "given as collateral
security" for the very reason that such a note shows on its
that the note in this case was made in 1896 and negotiated in May, 1897,

but that the New York Negotiable Instruments Law did not become
operative until October, 1897, and, therefore, as Judge White said, had

no application to the case. Whether Judge White meant that the act
did not apply because it was not yet operative, or because the note under
discussion was not covered by the section referred to, does not appear.-

"a 134 Mass. 245 (883).
'The Minnesota courts give the same reason for their decision as
those of Mass. Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn.530.
But the Kinsas courts (also ingtanced by Professor Ames) hold
chattel notes to be noi-negotiable, .not so much on the ground that they
are conditional, as that they contain stipulations other than the promise
to pay money. Killan v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 310 Pg. 312; South Bend Co.
v. Paddock, 37 Kan. 510. Should Kansas adopt the act, her courts
might, therefore, hold that the section under discussion changed the
above cases.
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face that the promise contained in it is conditional, why will
it cover a "chattel note" in jurisdictions which say that a
chattel note shows on its face that the promise contained
in it is conditional? That is Professor Ames' second criticism, to which n- answer seems to be furnished in Judge
Brewster's replies.
Professor Ames' conclusion is that Section 3, par. 2 is
"either useless or provocative of litigation."
If, by "useless" is meant that it will fail to overrule the
cases which hold chattel notes non-negotiable on the ground
that they are conditional promises, this subsection may
prove to be useless. Aside from this, however, it may not
have been unwise to insert it in the act. The clause is
cQpied almost word for word from Section 3, par 3 of the
English act,1 2 which was inserted to codify the decisions of
cases' 3 in which the instruments sued on contained language
which, while absolutely unnecessary to a negotiable instrument, nevertheless did not qualify the promise in any way,
nor contain any independent promise, but amounted to
nothing more than a brief description of how the instrument came to be drawn-a statement of the consideration
for which it was given-a memorandum that collateral
security for the note had been given-an indication of the
nature of the transaction. The courts held that such language did not affect the negotiable character of the instrument. Referring to this subsection, Mr. Arthur Cohen
says: "The words in the English act correctly state what
the English law is." The courts of this country do not
differ on this point from those of England. They have
held almost unanimously that language such as that used in
the English cases referred to does not destroy the negotiable
character of a bill or note.' 4 Section 3, par. 2, of the new
English Bills of Exchange Act (August 18, 1882) 45 and 46 Vict.
C. 6i. Sec. 3-3: "An unqualified order to pay coupled with a statement
of the transaction which gives rise to the bill, is unconditional." And
by Sec. 8g the above clause applies to promissory notes..

"Houssoullier v. Hartsinck, 7 Term Rep. 733 (1798); Griffn v.
Weatherby, L. R. 3 Q. B. 752 (1868).
144 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d Ed. 89 and cases there cited.
I Ames' Cases on "Bills and Notes." Note on p. 56. Devenny v. League
Island Loan and Bldg Assn., 9 W. N. C. (Pa.) 127; Citizens' Nat.
Bank of Towanda v. Piolett, 126 Pa. 194.
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act will doubtless be regarded here as it has been for twenty
years in England, as a codification of this rule of law, and as
such may serve a useful purpose.
Whether the clause will be provocative of litigation
remains to be seen. It has not given rise to a single case in
England, where it has been in force for twenty years, nor
has any case arisen under it as yet in this country. It will
quite likely come up for construction in the very few jurisdictions which have hitherto held chattel notes non-negotiable, but it is extremely unlikely that any lawyer will ever
attempt to have it applied to notes "given as collateral
-security."
Therefore, about the worst that can be said
against it is that it may not accomplish quite all that its
framers intended.
Section 9, par. 3:
"The instrument js payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person,
and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable."
Professor Ames levels two criticisms at this sub-section.
In the first place, he says that such a rule "ignores the tenor
of the instrument," meaning, for one thing, that to say an
instrument payable to "John White or order" is payable "to
bearer" is to ignore what the instrument itself says-even
though no such person as John White exists. The correct
way to interpret such an instrument, says Professor Ames,
is to give it the effect of an instrument payable to the order
of and indorsed by the drawer or maker respectively. Thus
a bill drawn by Andrew Smith payable "to the order of
John White" (a fictitious payee) and indorsed in the name
of John White ought to be treated as a bill drawn by
Andrew Smith payable to his own order, and by him
indorsed-this result being reached by regarding the bill
as payable to Andrew Smith by the name of John White. 15
Professor Ames objects to treating any such instrument as
payable "to bearer." Undoubtedly there are strong argu.
Professor Anes has long insisted that this is the correct way of
interpreting such instruments. See Ames' Cases on "Bills and Notes,"
Vol. 2 Summary, p. 864, published in 1881.
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ments in favor of such a view, and the whole question of
fictitious payees might have been simpler and more logical
had they originally prevailed. As a matter of fact, however, the act on this point merely codifies that which has
been the settled law of England and America for more than
a century. The arguments in support of Professor Ames'
view were fully presented both to the Court of King's Bench
and to the House of Lords in the leading case of Minet v.
Gibson, 6 decided in 1791. Both courts repudiated them
and'held that the holder in due course of a bill payable to
the order of a fictitious payee could, as against the drawee
who accepted knowing that no such person existed, declare
on the bill as payable to bearer and recover. 17 Lord Chief
Baron Eyre delivered a powerful dissenting opinion. "His
reasoning," Professor Ames has said, "has never been
refuted.""8 It is equally true that it has never been followed. Minet v. Gibson has been practically unanimously
followed both by English and American courts.' 9 It was
followed, moreover, in the English Bills of Exchange
Act,20 and it would have been strange indeed if the
.framers of the American act, who were codifying the law,
who were framing a code, moreover, which would have to
15I H. Blackstone, 569.
1
,Minet v.'Gibson is universally regarded as the leading case on this

point, though there had been several earlier decisions to the same effect.
Tatlock v. Harris,3 T. RL, z74; Vere v. Lewis, 3 T. R. 182; Collis v.
Emmett, Term Rep. C. P., 313.
'Ames' Cases on "Bills and Notes," Vol. I,p. 421.
"' Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 288; 6 Bro. P. C. 235, s. c.; The
Royal Bank of Scotland, ig Ves. 310; Farnsworthv. Drake, iiInd. IOI;
Smith v. Mechanics' Bank, 6 La. An. 61o, 624 (semble) ; Bartlett v.
Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 344 (semble); Rogers v. Ware, 2 Neb.

29

(semble) ; Fosterv. Shattuck, 2 N. H. 446; Plets v. Johnson,3 Hill, 112;
Stevens v. Strang, 2 Sandf. 138; Forbes v. Espy, 21 Oh. St. 474, 483
(semble); Hunter v. Blodget, z Yeates, 48o.
' It may aid comparison to print the corresponding sections of the two

acts together. Efiglish Bills of Exchange Act, Section 7, par. 3:
"When the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be
treated as'payable to bearer."
The Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 9, par. 3: "The instrument
is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or
non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it
so payable."
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run the gauntlet of nearly fifty legislatures, had attempted
anything so inexpedient as the overthrow of such a well
21
established and universally accepted rule.
The second criticism of Sub-section 9, par. 3, is that such
an instrument is, under the act, payable to bearer without
being i-ndorsed, and that this, also, ignores the tenor of the
instrument. "Nor is there any judicial precedent or mercantile custom," says Professor Ames, "in support of the notion
that a bill payable to a fictitious payee, but not indorsed in
the name of such payee, is payable to bearer. In all the
"reported cases, instruments piyable to a fictitious payee
have been indorsed in the name of such payee before negotiation." That is substantially true.2 2 If such an instrument requires no indorsement, a departure, has been made
from what has been supposed to be the law-and Professor
Ames and Judge Brewster agree that the new act dispenses
with the necessity of an indorsement. Indeed, any other
reading of it seems impQssible, tl ough whether an indorse'ment is necessary under the English act has never been
23
decided, and seems fairly open.
' The rule was originally based on the doctrine of estoppel. Prior
to the English act (1882) a recovery was never allowed except against
a defendant who became a party to the bill knowing that the payee was
fictitious. See Minet v. Gibson, i H. BI. 569, and Review of Cases by
Bowen, L. J., pp. 257-26o in Vagliano Bros. v. Bank of Eng., L. R. 23,
Q. B. D., 243 (1889). The English act, however, rendered the defendants knowledge immaterial, providing merely that a bill may be treated
as payable to bearer when the payee is fictitious. The American act
does not go so far, however, for it contains the proviso "and such fact
was known to the person mnaking it so payable.". But if the maker or
drawer knows the fact, then the bill is for all purposes payable to
bearer, and thus a drawee, who accepted in ignorance of the fact, would
be liable.
' In New York, however, it has been held for many years that a bill'
or note payable to the order of a fictitious payee is payable to bearer
without being indorsed by the maker or payee. Plets v. Johnson, 3 Hill,
ii2; Central Bank of Brooklyn v. Lang, i Bosworth, 203; Irving, N. B.
v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536:
'It might be argued that the words ."may be treated as payable to
bearer" used in the English act mean that the bill may be so treated
only when regular in all other respects, i. e., among other things, when
properly indorsed. Judge. Chalmers, the draughtsman of the English
act, says of this sub-section: "When a bill is payable to the order of
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Judge Brewster defends the change. He says: "Surely it is
more logical to hold that a note which purports to be payable
to a person when there is no such person, and the maker
knows it, must have been intended to be payable to bearer,
than to hold that somebody must assume the name of such
fictitious person and make a false indorsement in order to
give title to the note." There is much common sense in that.
But the trouble is that title to a note payable to order is derived through the indorsement on the back of it. What "must
have been intended" by a maker who names a fictitious payee
it is extremely hard to say. Moreover, both commercial
practice and legal theory tend more and more to disregard
everything except that which actually appears on the instrument. jWhen A. makes his note payable to "John White
or order" all our notions about negotiable paper require that
John White be written on the back of this note, even though
no such person as John White exists. It seems necessary
for form's sake. To dispense with the necessity for it gives
a decided jolt to our ideas. Aside from this, however, it is
difficult to see how any harm can result from the change.
In the first place (and though this does not touch the theory
of the criticism, it does touch its practical worth) notes payable to fictitious payees and unindorsed, will be about as
plentiful as counterfeit dollars labelled "counterfeit."
Either the, maker or the person to whom he delivers the
instrument will indorse it in the name of the fictitious payee.
a fictitious person, it is obvious that a genuine indorsement can never
be obtained, and in accordance with the language of the old cases and
text books, the act puts it on the footing of a bill payable to bearer.

But inasmuch as a bill payable to one person but in the hands of another
is patently irregular, it is clear that the bill should be indorsed, and perhaps a bona Eide holder would be justified in indorsing it in the payee s
name. It might have been better if the act had provided that a bill
payable to the order of a fictitious person might be treated as payable to
the order of anyone who should indorse it, or, in other words, as
indorsable by the bearer.' Chalmers' Bills of Exchange, 5th Edition,
page 22. From this, it would appear that the failure of the English
act to require an indorsement was a mere oversighit-though the use
of the words "may be treated" furnishes a method of correcting the
omission. judge Brewsteres readiness to defend the change in the
American act seems to indicate that the change was intentional. Except
for this, one would suppose that it had been an oversight.

450
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Why? Because otherwise no one would discount it. It
would be patently irregular on its face. An indorsement is
necessary to give such a note any commercial value. Professor Ames supposes one case which, in his opinion, works
an injustice on the maker. He says, "By the combined
effect of this section and section 16 24 if a note payable to a
fictitious payee were stolen from the maker and indorsed
by the thief in the name of the payee, the maker would be
liable upon the note to any holder in due course. For, the
note being already payable to bearer, the forged indorsement
in the payee's name would be of no legal significance. Such
a result would be a cruel injustice to the maker."
Clearly the maker would be liable in such a case, but is
this a "cruel injustice ?" If the note were stolen when made
expressly payable to bearer or when made payable to a
fictitious payee, and then indorsed, there would be no injustice in holding the maker. How much more sympathy is he
entitled to when (though not ind6rsing the note) he deliberately chooses to name a payee, well knowing that there is no
such person in existence. If it is merely a question of the
actual justice meted out, it takes a nice distinction and a
very tender heaft to produce much sympathy for the maker
in the case supposed. Both parties are innocent of fraud,
but it is the maker's conduct that made the fraud possible
and he should bear the loss. Even in the rare case where
no indorsement whatever appears on the back of the note,
no actual injustice is done in holding the maker liable. The
real worth of the criticism lies in its technical point, namely,
that this sub-section permits the transfer, without indorsement, of an instrument which, for all that appears on the
face of it, requires an indorsement to make a valid transfer.
It remains to notice one or two other points before passing
this sub-section.
In his first paper, Judge Brewster seemed to suggest that
notes payable to the order of unincorporated associations
or to the estates of deceased persons are payable to bearer
'Section 16 provides, inter alia, "Where the instrument is in the
hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties
prior to him, so as to make them liable to him, is conclusively presumed."
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by force of Section 9, par. 3. Professor Ames performs a
real service in disposing of such a notion in vigorous
fashion, though the discussion on this point was evidently
due to a misunderstanding, as in his second paper, Judge
Brewster disclaims holding any such view as that attributed
to him. The point, however, is worthy of notice, since both
Mr. Crawford and Mr. Selover, in their published Annotations of the act, seem to have gone astray on this point and to
seriously regard notes payable to the estate of a deceased
pers6n as payable to bearer.2 5

Such an interpretation is

opposed alike to reason and authority, and should it-prevail,
much harm might result. Moreover, such was not the law
prior to the act, and there is absolutely nothing in this subsection which either suggests or warrants such a change.
The meaning of the words "fictitious or non-existing person," used in the corresponding section of the English act,
came before the House of Lords inthecaseof Vagliano Bros.
2
v. The Bank of England..
The plaintiffs in that case were in
the habit of accepting bills drawn on them by "V" (their foreign correspondent) in favor of Fetridi & Co., a foreign firm.
' "Thus a note made payable to the order of the estate of a deceased
person is a promissory note with a fictitious payee, and where it has
been negotiated by the maker, is deemed, as against him, to be a note
payable to bearer. Lewisohn v. Kemp, 87 Hun. 257." Crawford's Neg.
Inst. Law, p. I8.

"When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any
person, as in the case of instruments payable to an estate . . . the
paper is payable to bearer. Scott v. Parker, 5 N. Y. Supp. 753;
Lewisohn v. Kemp, 33 N. Y. Supp. 826." Selover's Neg. Inst. Law, p.
73.
True, there is a dictum to this effect in Lewisohn v. Kemp, but, as
Professor Ames justly says: "It is a perversion of language to call the
payee in such a note a fictitious or non-existing person. In Shaw v.
Smith, I5O Mass. i66, and Peltier v. Habillon, 45 Mich. 384, such a note
was properly interpreted as a note payable "to the legal representatives
of A." As to bills-payable to an unincorporated company, judge Chalmers says: "The signature of a fictitious person must be distinguished
from the signature of a real person using a fictitious name-for instance,
John Smith may trade as 'The Birmingham Hardware Company' and
sign accordingly. Schultz v. Astley (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 544." Chalmers' Bills of Exchange, 5th Edition, p. 23.
" L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 243 (I889) ahd L. R. I6 Appeal Cases IO7 (i8gi).
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One Glyka, the plaintiffs' clerk, fraudulently drew a bill in
V.'s name on the plaintiffs, payable to Petridi & Company.
After the plaintiffs had accepted it, Glyka forged Petridi &
Company's name and had the bill cashed by the Bank of
England. Of course, Glyka never intended that the bill
should be delivered to Petridi & Company or that they
should receive any money on it, the whole transaction being
a fraud on his part. The question came up whether this
was a bill payable to bearer within this sub-section of the
English act. The House of Lords, reversing the lower
court, held that Petridi & Company was a fictitious person
within the act and that the bill was therefore payable to
bearer, but the opinions delivered in both courts disclose
a wide difference of opinion as to the true meaning of the
words "fictitious or non-existing person." 27 The possiThe majority in the Lower Court, speaking through Bowen, L. J.,
held that Petridi & Company were not fictitious payees, inasmuch as
they were not known to be such by the'party sought to be chdrged, i. e.,
the acceptor. "By the woras 'The bill may be treated as payable to
bearer' must surely be understood 'treated as against those who are to
be made liable for the bill.' The word 'fictitious' must in each case be
interpreted with due regard to the person against whom the bill is
sought to be enforced.

. . .

If the obligations of the acceptor are in

question, and the acceptor is the person against whom the bill is to be
so treated, 'fictitious' must mean fictitious as regards the acceptor and
to his knowledge." Such an interpretation could scarcely be made
under our act, which, instead of saying, "may be treated as payable to
bearer" says, "is payable to bearer" and clearly points out the only person whose knowledge is material, i. e., the person making it so payable.
Lord Bramwell, in a trenchant dissent in the House of Lords, held that
Petridi & Company was not a "fictitious or non-existing person" within
the meaning of the act, since it was a real, existing firm, "as identifiable
as N. W. Rothschild & Company-Glyn, Mills, Currie & Company-as the
Bank of England itself." On the other hand, Esher, M. R. (dissenting in
the Lower Court), thought that "fictitious" must embrace an existing person for "If 'fictitious' in this sub-section does not apply to the name of an
existing person, who is not really intended to be the payee, I can see no
distinction between 'fictitious' and 'non-existing' in the sub-section."
Lord Bramwell characterized this argument as "very feeble.

.

. . A

prudent draughtsman. does not accurately examine whether a word will
be superfluous. He makes sure by using it.'"
Judge Chalmers says that the words "or non-existing" seem superfluous and that they probably were intended to cover the case of Ashpitel v. Bryan (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 91, in which, by arrangement
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bility of litigation of the same sort under our act might
have been avoided by substituting "wheri the drawer or
maker knowingly makes the instrument payable to the
order of a fictitious or non-existing payee, or a living person
not intended to have any interest in it,"2s though probably

the words of the act will prove to be sufficiently precise.
Finally, it may be noted that the words used in the
English: act "may be treated as payable to bearer" are less
betwden the indorsee and acceptor, a bill was drawn and indorsed in
the name of a deceased person. Chalmers' Bills of Exchange, 5th
Edition, pp. 21 and 22.

Halsbury, L. C., held that if the person named in the bill is not the
real payee, then, although a real person, he is "fictitious" within the
statute. But Lord Selbourne thought the statute did not extend to the
case of a real person falsely represented as payee because "the Legislature has here described 'a person' as 'fictitious or non-existing' instead
of saying 'when the payee is fictitious or non-existing."'
The majority of the House of Lords held (though for very different
reasons) that Petridi & Company were fictitious payees within the
meaning of this sub-section and that, therefore, the bill Was payable to
bearer.
See also Clutton & Co. v. Attenborough, L. R. 2 Q. B., pp. 3o6 and
707. The plaintiffs' clerk, by fraudulently representing that work had
been done for them by one George Brett, induced them to draw checks
payable to the order of George Brett in payment of the pretended work.
In point of fact, no such person as George Brett existed. The clerk
then forged Brett's indorsement and cashed the checks. Held that
Brett was none the less a fictitious or non-existing person within the azt
because at the time of drawing the checks the plaintiffs supposed him to
be a real person. Therefore, these checks were to be treated as payable
to bearer., The decision in this case would be different under the American act, which insists that the fictitious character of the payee-must
be known to the person making the instrument so payable.
"'The words in italics are practically Professor Ames' suggestion,
except that he uses "person"' instead of "payee." It is submitted that the
latter word would be better. "In truth, if strictly construed, the words
'fictitious person' are a contradiction. One may pretend there is a person
when there is not. One may assume a character which does not belong
to one. But to satisfy the word 'fictitious,' as applicable to a person, is
assuming in one part of the proposition what is denied in the other."
Per Halsbury, L. C., in Vagliano Bros. v. Thw Bank of England. In
addition to this rather fine spun reason, the use of the words "fictitious
person" presented a real difficulty to Lord Selbourne. See extract from
his opinion, cited in the preceding note on Vagliano Bros. v. Bank of
England.
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fortunate than the wording of our act, which says, "is payable to bearer when," etc. Under our act, it is payable to
bearer for all purposes just as completely as if it had indeed
been expressly so drawn. In England, however, the question may arise, "Who may so treat it ?" In Vagliano Bros.
v.-The Bank of England, Lord Bramwell insisted that this
sub-section was inserted solely for the benefit of the holder,
but the majority thought that the bill might be treated as
payable to bearer by any person whose rights or liabilities
depended upon whether it was a bill payable to order or to
bearer
Section. 9, par., 1-5:

"The instrument is payable to bearer (I) when it is
expressed to be -so payable; or (5) when the only or
last indorsement is an indorsement in blank."
Section 4o, which is involved in the discussion of Section
9, par. 1-5, reads:

"When an instrument, payable to bearei, is indorsed
specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable
as indorser to only such holders as make title through
his indorsement."
One or two preliminary observations may aid to a proper
understanding of the criticisms made of these sections.
Blank indorsements were unknown to the early law of
Bills and Notes, which required that the name of the indorsee
should be contained in the indorsement. A practice later
arose by which the payee often wrote only his own name on
the back of a bill, leaving a blank above his signature for the
name of the indorsee. Hence the term "blank indorsement." The bill being transferred in this condition, the
transferee or any subsequent hblder has an implied authority
"to write above the signature an order of payment to himself, or to bearer,, or to anyone to whom he may wish in
turn to transfer the bill; and the blank indorsement, when
so filled up, takes effect by relation from the time of the
original delivery by the indorser." 29 The transferee 'or
dny subsequent holder is the indorser's agent for this pur" Ames' Cases on "Bills and Notes," Vol. 2, p. 837.
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pose. For a long tinie it was necessary .to exercise this
authority and fill out all the blank indorsements on a bill
at or before trial. Gradually this last requirement was dispensed with, and thus a bill payable to the order of A.-with
" A.'s name written oii the back (no indorsee being named)
could be recovered on by the holder.80 Such instruments
are said to be payable to bearer, and indeed they are so while
thie indorsement remains blank, but although the necessity
of filling up a blank indorsement has been dispensed with,
the right to do so has never been abridged, and the holder
of a bill or note has to-day, as he always had, the right to
fill up any or all blank indorsements on the instrument and
thus make it payable only to order.
It is to be observed-and this is important-that these
rules in no way violate the original tenor of the instrument.
The maker has promised to pay "A. or order" and A., by
signing his name with a blank above it and handing it to B.,
authorizes B. or any subsequent holder to designate the person entitled to receive payment. Until they do so designate
him, the holder is the man entitled. Now, suppose B.
"indorses specially to C. or order, and then C. transfers the
paper to D. by mere delivery. Should D. be allowed to sue
the maker as on a note payable to bearer? No, for since the
maker has promised only to pay to A.'s order-and since A.
has given B. or any holder authority to designate the one to
whom the sum shall be paid-and since B. has designated
that it shall be paid "to C. or order"--plainly no one who
cannot trace title through C. comes within the terms of the
maker's promise. - That is the logical view, and it is the
view that the merchants and bankers adopted, i. e., a blank
indorsement of a note payable to order is controlled by the
subsequent special indorsement.
But the courts held otherwise. In the case of Smith v.
Clarke,3' decided in 1794, a bill originally payable to order,
'This added a new term to the indorser's order, i. e., that until the
blank was-filled up the instrument should be payable to bearer.

'Peake, 225. Although in a case which arose some years earlier,
Atncher v.' Bank of England, 2 Douglas, p. 637 (1781), Lord Mansfield
evidently agreed with the understanding of merchants that a blank
indorsement was controlled by a subsequeht special indorsement. However, the exact point decided in Smith v. Clarke was not involved in that

case.
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was indorsed in blank by the payee and was subsequently
indorsed specially. Lord Kenyon held that the bill was
payable to bearer as long as the first indorsement remained
blank, and that the holder might therefore strike out the
special indorsement and recover as on a bill payable to
bearer. Smith v. Clarke has been generally followed both
.in England and America.3 2 This decision was opposed to
the view held by the business community, and so, in 1882,
the framers of the English act, in order "to bring the law
into accordance with the mercantile understanding, by making a special indorsement conirol a previous indorsement in
blank," 33 provided in Section 8, par. 3:
"A bill is payable to bearer which is expressed to be
so payable, or on which the only or last indorsement
is an indorsement in blank."
The provisions of Section 9, par. 1-5 of the American act.
are the same as those of the English act and were inserted
for the same reason.
It is further to be observed that Smith v. Clarke and all
of the cases which follow it are cases of instruments originally payable to order. None of these cases contains a
syllable about instruments originally made payable to bearer.
There is an important distinction between the two kinds of
instruments. For reasons which I have referred to above,
the custom of merchants, which has now been adopted by
both the English and American acts, says that in the case of
an instrument originally payable to order, a blank indorsement is controlled by a subsequent special indorsement,
because in such a case the maker's promise embraces only,
those who make title through the special indorsement. But
a note originally payable to bearer is another matter. It is
a violation of the plain tenor of such a note to treat it as
other than payable to bearer. ' That is the maker's absolute
" Walker v. MacDonald, 2 Wels Hurl & Gordon, 526 (1848); Houie
v. Bailey, 16 La.

213

"(184o) ; Natipnal Bank v. Haskins, OI Mass. 370

(I869); Houry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 3 (1876); Watervliet Bank v.
White,.i Denio 6o8 (845) ; Pentz v. Winterbottom, 5 Denio 51 (i8 4 7) ;

French v. Barney, i Iredell 219 (184o); Mitchell v. Fuller, 15 Pa. "268

(I85O); Rand v. Dovey, 83 Pa. 28o (877).
i Randolph

Contra: Myers v. Friend,

12 (1821).

',Chalmers'

Bills of .Exchange, 5th Edition, p. 24.
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promise-to pay the bearer. His promise cannot be qualified or changed in any way by a subsequent holder. The
only effect of a special indorsement on such a note is that
the indorser can be held only by those who make title
through his indorsement. 3 4
This distinction between instruments originally payable
to bearer and instruments originally payable to order and
then indorsed in blank is preserved both in the English and
American acts. Under both acts, a note originally payable
to bearer and specially indorsed continues payable to bearer,
while an instrument originally payable to order is payable to
bearer only when the last indorsement is in blank. Profes-'
sor Ames says that this distinction is "illogical and undesirable" though he gives us no reasons. Judge Brewster's
reply is equally brief: "The reason why such a rule is 'illogical and undesirable' is not clear." It is submitted that for
the reasons noted above, this distinction is decidedly "logical," and inasmuch as it appears to obtain generally throughout the business community, its continued observance by the.
Code would seem to be "desirable."
Professor Ames further criticises this sub-section, as
follows:
"If an instrument indorsed in blank and subsequently indorsed specially, so that it is no longer payable to bearer, is
transferred by the special indorsee by delivery merely, .the
transferee cannot sue parties prior to the special indorser in
his own name, but only in the name of his assignor. This
puts the assignee to unnecessary inconvenience. As owner
of the instiument, although not, according to this *subsection, holder, he ought to have the right to strike out the
special indorsement, thus making the instrument once more
payable to bearer, and as bearer to sue upon it in his own
name." I. e., A. makes a note to B. or order. B. indorses
in blank. C. indorses it "to D. or order" and D. delivers it
(without indorsement) to E. Professor Ames thinks that
E. should have the right to strike out C.'s indorsement and
sue A. or B. as on a note payable to bearer.
"Story, Bills of Exchange, Section 207; Wood's Byles on Bills and
Notes, I5I.
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Why should he have this right? It has long been the
law (and still is under Section 48)3 5 that .the holder may
strike out any indorsements which are not necessary to his
title. The law has never permitted him to strike out indorsements which are necessary to his title.3 6 Now, so long as
Lord Kenyon's doctrine3 7 prevailed, the holder had the right
to'strike out all indorsements subsequent to the first blank
indorsement because the instrument was by that first blank
indorsement payable to bearer and a subsequent special
indorsement did not change its tenor and was therefore not
necessary to his title. But this. sub-section was inserted for
the express purpose of doing away with Lord Kenyon's
doctrine. Everybody agrees that a blank indorsement of
an instrument originally payable to order ought to be affected•
by a subsequent special indorsement. -What does this
change mean, then? Why it means (taking the case
Professor Ames supposes for us) that by virtue of the special
indorsement by C. the note has again become payable only
to order, and therefore C.'s indorsement cannot be stricken
out by a subsequent holder because it is necessary to his title.
Suppose D. had in his turn indorsed specially to E. The
latter (though nowra holder within the meaning of the act)
could not strike out the indorsements of C. and D. Why?
Because the instrument being now again payable to order
only, the indorsements of C. and D. are necessary to his
title, and so Section 48 gives him no right to strike them
out. Professor Ames says, "As owner of the instrument,
he ought to have the right." But ownership of a bill or
note gives the holder no right to alter it-to change the
tenor of any of the promises which it evidences.
Judge Brewster answers this criticism, however, in
another way. He first agrees with Professor Ames that E.
(in the case supposed) ought to be allowed to strike out C.'sspecial indorsement, and then he tries to give him this
'Sec.

48: ".The holder may at al1y time strike out any indorsement

which is not necessary to his title. The indorsee ivhose indorsement is
struck out, and all indorsees, subsequent to. him are thereby relieved

from liability on the instrument."
-1 Story, Promissory Notes, Section 2o8.
,' Smith v. Clarke, supro.
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right.88 He first points to Section 48, which gives the right
to strike out indorsemdnts not necessary to. title. But Professor Ames reminds him that Section 48 confers this right
only on holders and that E. is not a holder, for "holder" is
defined in Section 191 to mean "The payee or indorsee of
a bill or note who' is in possession of it, or ithe bearer
thereof," and "bearer" is defined by the same section to
mean "The person in possession of a bill or note which is
payable to bearer." Both ignore the .fact that in the case
supposed C.'s indorsement is necessary to E.'s title.
In order to give E. the right to sue the maker, Judge
Brewster next refers to Section 4o, which provides inter alia
that "When an instrument payable to bearer is indorsed
specially, it nmay inevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery."'
"This section," says Judge Brewster, "which authorizes
a transfer by delivery seems to give the transferee the right
to sue in his own name, otherwise the note would not be
negotiated within the meaning of the act." But if Section
4o applies to a note originally payable to order-then'
indorsed in blank and made payable to bearer-and then
'indorsed specially-if such an instrument may still be negotiated by delivery, then the rule of Smith v. Clarke is still in
full force, and Section 9, par. 5, which was inserted to overthrow Smith v. Clarke is a nullity. That carries us to the
next criticism.
Professor Ames insists that Section 40 completely nullifies Section 9,par. 5, and that for this reason only may E.
sue the maker in the case supposed. His position is that
Section 9, par. 5, was inserted to change the old rule that
Mr. Farrell answers Professor Ames as follows: "In answer to this,
it is necessary only to say that in most jurisdictions he may bring suit
in his own name, being the real party in interest." (The Negotiable
Instruments Law, by Jno. Lawrence Farrell. Brief of Phi Delta Phi,
Vol. III, No. 2, First Quarter, igol.) But the statutes which permit an
assignee to sue in his own name have effected merely a procedural
change. He is still an assignee merely and can be met by any defence
arising out of' the instrument which could be pleaded against the
assignor. The question is not, in whose name shall E. bring suit (a

minor point), but it is, what right can E. assert.
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an instrument "payable to bearer (or indorsed in blank)" 3 9
although afterwards specially indorsed, was still negotiable
by delivery-that "then, in apparent forgetfulness of the
effect of Section 9, par. 5," Section 40 was inserted providing that an instrument payable to bearer and indorsed specially is still negotiable by delivery, the special indorsee
being liable only to such as make title through his indorsement, and that this section (4o) thus changes the law back
to its former state.
Judge Brewster's answer is:
"Section 40 is claimed to be repugnant to Section 9, par. 5,
-but this is not so. Section 9, par. 5, declares a note to be
payable to bearer when its last indorsement is in blank; 40
relates to a note when the last indorsement is special, and
provides that it may then be transferred by delivery,4" in
order to cover cases of good faith where title is frequently
passed in that way, by persons ignorant of mercantile usage."
It is submitted that that is no answer, and for this reason.
.If a bill may be transferred by delivery, it is payable to
bearer. Section 4o, on Judge Brewster's reading, permits a
bill whose last indorsement is special to be payable to bearer,
yet Section 9, -par. 1-5 was inserted to permit only bills
originally payable to bearer or whose last indorsement is in
blank to be payable to bearer.4 1
"These are Professor Ames' words; but if by "Payable to bearer"
he means originally payable to bearer, it is submitted that neither Smith
v. Clarke nor any of the cases which follow it say any thing about such
instruments. They are all cases of instruments originally payable to
order.
oThe italics are the reviewer's.
"Judge Brewster cites the following passage from the new Norton
Horn Book by Mr. Tiffany, p. 116 to prove that Section 4o and Section
9, par. 5 are in harmony: "An instrument which is originally payable to.
bearer, or which has been indorsed in'blank, though afterwards specially
indorsed, is still payable to bearer; except as to the special indorser,
who, on such an indorsement, after such an indorsement, is only liable
on his indorsement to such parties as make title through it."
It is submitted that the above tends to prove just the reverse, because
if by Section 4o an instrument originally'payable to order, then indorsed
in .blank, and then specially indorsed, is still payable to bearer, Section
9, par. 5 (which intended to make only instruments whose last indorsement is in blank payable -to bearer) is nullified.
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I submit that in one way and one way only can these two
sections be harmonized. If Section 4o be interpreted as
applying only to instruments originally payable to bearer,
there can be no difficulty as to either section. True, it reads
merely "When an instrument payable to bearer is indorsed
specially," etc., and there is no denying that if it meant only
an instrument originally payable to bearer it should have
said so. At the same time, the words used are commonly
understood to describe an instrument originally payable to
bearer, and there is the additional reason that unless these
words are so interpreted here, the section is diametrically
opposed to Section 9, par. 5, a conclusion plainly to be
avoided if possible. Again, Section 9, par. 5, can be construed in.only one way, while Section 40 may be construed
either as being opposed to or as being in harmony with it.
Moreover, such an interpretation would be good law. At
the opening of the discussion of these sections, some reasons
were submitted why the distinction between instruments
originally payable to bearer and those originally payable to
order and indorsed in blank, was both logical and desirable.
However this may be, such a distinction is certainly made in
Section 9, par. 5, and it has been made without complaint
for twenty years in the English act. The suggested interpretation of Section 4o preserves this and the two sections
would be harmonious. By Section 9, par. I, an instrument
originally payable to bearer continues to be payable to bearer
even though specially indorsed. But if it is specially indorsed, then. by Section 4o "the person indorsing specially
is liable as indorser only to such holders as make -title
through his indorsement," and this has always been the
law. 42

By Section 9, par. 5, on the other hand, a bill

originally payable to order is payable to bearer only when
the only or last indorsement is in blank. Every one of these
propositions is good law and accords with the understanding
of merchants.

-

Mr. Crawford, the draughtsman of the act, actually rejards Section
4o as embodying the decision of Smith v. Clarke (Crawford's Annotated
Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 41). Yet admittedly Section 9, par, 5
was intended to overthrow that decision.
' Story, Bills of Exchange, Section 207; Wood's Byles on Bills and
Notes, p. 151.
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The remaining criticism of this sub-section is unimportant. "If it is to be taken as it stands," says Professor
Ames, "a note payable by A. to the order of B., and bearing
the anomalous blank indorsement of C., would be payable
to bearer. This, of course, would be an absurdity, but it
is certainly true that the only indorsement is an indorsement
in blank."
Professor Ames does not suggest that any merchant, any
lawyer, any court would ever give the section such a construction. Nor does it require any stretch of the English
language to arrive at its proper meaning. An anoma-lous infdorser is not strictly an indorser at all. He is
called one for convenience sake and a liability closely resembling that of an indorser is fastened upon him. But a section
which uses the word "indorsement" witht reference to the
transfer of an instrument, could scarcely be regarded as
having any reference whatever to an anomalous indorser.
The words used in Section 9, par. 5, of the American act
have been found entirely satisfactory in the English act
throughout twenty years' experience, and there can be no
reasonable doubt as to their meaning with reference to an
anomalous blank indorsement.
Section 20:

"Where the instrument contains or a person adds to
his signature words indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he
is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as
an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing the principal, does not exempt him from
personal liability."
Professor Ames criticises this section as follows:
"Section 2o provides that a' erson who purports to sign
an instrument in behalf of a named principal is not liable on
the instrument, if he was duly authorized by the principal.
By necessary implication he is liable on the instrument if
not duly authorized. 43 This is a departure from the English
act and from the almost uniform current of judicial deci" "Mr. Crawford so interprets the section. Crawford's An. N. I. L. 26."
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sions. This new rule involves a flat contradiction of the
instrument, and the fiction works not justice, but injustice."
The section is copied from Article 95 of the German
Exchange Law, and undoubtedly is a departure from the
English act, under which the pretended agent is liable, not
on the instrument, but for the damage resulting from the
breach of his implied warranty of authority to sign for the
principal. Mr. Crawford's original draft embodied the
English rule,44 but the Commissioners changed it and
adopted the German rule deliberately and after mature consideration. It is scarcely true that in doing so they departed
from "the almost uniform current of judicial decisions."
There is a strong conflict of authority on the point, some
states holding the pretended agent liable on the instrument
itself, while a somewhat larger number hold him liable only
for the damage resulting from the breach of his implied
warranty of authority. 45 The latter decisions seem correct
on theory. As was said in Hall v. Crandall,if the instrument contains language which does not in legal effect charge
the pretended agent, "or, in other words, contains language
which, in legal effect, binds the principal only, the agent
cannot be sued on the instrument itself, for the obvious
reason that the contract is not his." He has falsely represented that he had authority to bind another, but he has not
intended or attempted to bind himself, and courts which
hold him liable on the contract itself "treat all matter which
the contract contains in relation to the principal as surplusCrawford, An. N. I. L. 26.
In the following states the pretended agent appears to be held liable
on the contract itself: Ormsby v. Kendall, 2 Ark. 338 (but see Dale v.
Donaldson, 48 Ark. i9o); Richie v. Bass, 15 La. Ann. 668; Terzvilliger
v. Murphy, IO4 Ind. 32; Keener v. Harrod,2 Md. 63; Byas v. Doores,
20 Mo. 284; Weare v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196; Clarke v. Foster, 8 Vt. 98.

In the following states, the pretended agent is held liable not on the
contract itself,, but- for the damage resulting from the breach of his
implied warranty of authority: Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 567; Jolmson
v. Smith, I Conn. 627; Duncan v. Niles, 32 Ill. 532 (but see Frankland
v. Johnson, 147 Ill. 520) ; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; Noyes v.

Loring, 5$ Me. 408; Sheffield v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 388; White v. Madison,
26 N. Y. 117; Bryson v. Lucas, 84 N. C. 68o; Hopkins v. Mehaffy, ii S.
& R. (Pa.) 126.
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age, which is, in effect, to make a new contract for the parties
concerned instead of construing the one which they made
46
for themselves."
Judge Brewster's answer is: "One signing a note as agent
for another should know and be able to show his authority.
If he signs without authority, he alone in fact, and so in
law, is the maker of the note, and he should be held liable
accordingly." This view, though perhaps difficult to justify
on the
principles of contract, is supported by weighty authority, 47 and important practical advantages. The rule will
tend to increase negotiability, by assuring the holder that if
the pretended principal cannot be reached because of a lack
of authority in the agent, a recovery may be had on the
instrument itself against the agent. Then there is the additional advantage-which on reflection will appear to be of
great importance-that the liability of the agent can be
easily proved and the amount to be recovered ascertained by
a mere inspection of the instrument, whereas if the only
recovery were for damages resulting from a breach of warranty, a complicated set of disputed facts would often go to
"Hall v. Crandall,supra. Referring to the cases which hold the pretended agent liable on the instrument, Walton, J., said in Noyes v.
Loring, 55 Me. 408: "The inconsistency of such a doctrine, to use no
stronger term, will be apparent by supposing that instead of a promise
to pay money the pretended agent had signed a promise that his principal should marry the plaintiff within a given time, or do some other
act which it was perfectly competent for the principal to perform, but
which the agent could not. What would be thought of a declaration
charging the pretended agent as a principal in such a case?"
"To the decisions referred to above, and the very high authority of
the German Code, there may be added the opinion of Mr. Arthur Cohen,
Q. C. (one of the framers of the English act, and admittedly one of the
leading experts in England on this subject), who regards Section 2o
as an improvement on the English act. He says: "This section certainly alters the law as it exists in England, but I think it very likel),
that the alteration is an improvement. The wisdom of the rule laid
down in Cohen v. Wright has often been doubted.

.

.

. I think the

2oth Section should be retained, and may be considered as a practical
improvement of the law, unless there be reason "to suppose that merchants and bankers think it unjust. I agree with Mr. Brewster that
much indulgence should not be shown in business to a person who piofesses to have authority when he is really acting without authority."
Letter from Mr. Cohen tQ Judge Brewster, written March 31, 1901.
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the jury, from which it would be difficult even to approximate the damage. The case which Professor Ames supposes,
as proving the injustice of Section 20 may serve as an illustration of this. He says, "For example, A., mistakenly
believing that he is duly authorized, signs a note, 'A., agent
for B.,' and delivers it to C., the payee. At maturity B.
repudiates the note. He is, however, at that time a bankrupt. A. is rightfully chargeable to C. on his implied warranty of authority, but only to the amount that C. might
have recovered from B., if he had authorized the note. But
under Section 20 A. is liable to C. for the face of the note."
But, as Mr. Cohen points out, "It would be doubtful'what
could be recovered until the dividend was declared and the
bankruptcy concluded; and in the case of the principal not
being bankrupt, but being a man in bad credit, the question
would have to be left to a jury what amount could probably
be recovered from the principal. It may well be held that
in actions on negotiable instruments against a person who
professedly acts on behalf of another person, A., it would be
inconvenient to allow the former to attempt to prove that
probably the whole amount could not be recovered from A."
So the case stands about as follows: The rule discarded
by the Commissioners works out the rights of the parties
strictly on the rules of contract, and the balance of authority
is in its favor. Under it, however, a plaintiff may encounter
considerable difficulty and uncertainty in proving his case.
The rule they have embodied in the act-while perhaps less
clear on theory-is supported by the authority of several
states, by the German Code, by some of the best expert
opinion of England, and (besides tending to increase negotiability) enables a plaintiff to know and prove, with ease
and certainty, the amount to be recovered. Of course,
under such circumstances, individual opinion will 'differ
somewhat as to which rule should have been chosen.
Charles L. McKeehan.
(To be continued in the September nunber.)

